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Chapter II 
The Determination of Observed Merchandise Imports and Their Link to Capital Formation* 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the possibility of measuring 
an 11import tunction11 for the post war Colanbian economy, to examine how imports 
were divided into different categories, and to analyze the crucial link 
between imports and ca.pital formation. A later chapter will deal with the 
mechanisms of import control in greater detail. 
The \;import function 11 to be estimated is somewhat unusual. Time series 
giving merchandise imports entering Colanbia (legally) cannot be assumed to 
result solely from the interplSiY of the ex-ante domestic demand for imports, 
itself the difference between the domestic supply and demand for importables, 
and a perfectly price-elastic foreign supply of imports. During most of 
the period under study, the institutional mechanism of import control explicitly 
aimed at regulating import permits in such a wa:y that actual imports would 
be i:in linen with foreign exchange availability. Such actual and expeated 
availability influenced the amount of import permits granted, and, as seen 
in Chapter I, PSiYillent crises were blamed on departures from 11prudeney11 • 
The .Aggregate Import Function 
It would seem, therefore, better to seek econometrical.J.y- the implicit 
average rules of prudency, than to follow the usual pa.th of making observed . 
imports a function of income, relative prices, etc. Indeed, that usual 
pa.th is open to serious conceptual criticisms where imports are regulated 
as in Colombia. It can be argued that imports in such a case should be 
considered the independent variable, with income and relative prices both 
becoming depsndent variables. 
In what follows, an attempt is made to explain observed annual end 
quarterly imports as a :function o:f' variables which those in charge ot the 
control mechanism typically regarded as proxies for actual and expected foreign 
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exchange availability, i.e., the level of reserves, expected merchandise 
exports and aid. 
Why reserves? If the authorities had a desired level of reserves, and 
alwa;,s forecasted exactly foreign exchange earnings, imports would fluctuate 
following the latter, showing no correlation with the former. It mey be 
supposed, however, that forecasting is far from perfect, and that unexpected 
increases or decreases in reserves will be followed by relaxation or tightening 
of controls, which will be reflected in the level of imports gradually, 
with some lag. The hypothesis is that imports in a given yea:r or quarter 
will be influenced by the difference between actual and desired Central 
Bank reserves during previous years or quarters. 
In the regressions which follow, gross Central Bank reserves will be 
used. Earlier experiments showed that gross, rather than net, reserves gave 
the best fits. This may be due to data problems involved in defining accu­
rately net reserves, but it could reflect a certa.in type of liquidity 
preference of Central Bankers. "Desired (gross) reserves:; were defined in 
a. straightforward unsophisticated way: the average gross reserves to imports 
ratio for the whole period under study was first computed; that ratio was 
then applied to actual annual or quarterly imports to obtain "desired" 
reserves. The average reserves/imports ratio implied desired reserves 
amounting to about three months worth of imports. 
Note that from the time an import license is granted to the entry into 
Colombia of the imported commodity, at which point it enters our time series, 
an average of six months are said to elapse. Imports of a given time period 
can then be made to depend on lagged (actuai and desired) reserves, avoiding 
most problems of interdependence, particularly in quarterly regressions.1 
•. It 
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There are several possible ways of handling expected (non-aid) foreign 
exchange earnings, the bulk of which, and probably its most volatile nnajor 
part, are merchandise exports. One way is to use lagged changes in reserves 
as a proxy for those expectations; that approach was tried, yielding on the 
whole poor results. Another (not tried), would be to rely on lagged changes 
in coffee prices. In w:1at follows, it was simply assumed that for a given 
time period, the ex-ante guesses of the authorities on average came close 
to actual, realizerl merchandise exports. Because of the lag in the granting 
and using of import licenses, it should be clear that a given quarter's 
actual exports can have little direct (Keynesian or monetary) effect on that 
quarter's realized imports, so the simultaneous use of imports and exports 
of the same quarter in~ regression need not give rise to identification 
problems. For the annual observations it is not so easy to dismiss the 
possibility that exports will influence imports via income or money multipliers; 
for that case one must rely primarily on a -priori J!"..nowledge of how import 
controls operated, and of the chronic (but variable) existence of excess 
demand for imports. 
The inclusion of aid as a va,riable explaining imports in a 
11 foreign­
exchange constrained" economy seems natural. As the aid variable is based 
on disbursements, which are in fact typically measured by documentation 
regarding import flows, one may view the regressions as measuring the impact 
of the other two independent variables on the level of non-aid financed 
imports. It was, however, difficult to measure accurately quarterly, as 
contrasted with annual, aid flows. Repayt1ents of principal were subtracted 
from gross disbursements, to yieJ.d t1:1e 11 net aidn used in the regressions. 
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Table II-1 presents data used in the annual regressions; it also gives 
more detail on how the reserve and aid independent variables were constructed. 
The best fit using those data was the following: 
(II-1) Mt = -58.06 + 1.03 Xt + O. 71 GRt l + 1.23 At 
(0.7) (6.3) (2.2) - (3.7) 
2
R =082. 
F-test = 25.9 
DW = 1.87 
Observations= 21 
Where, 
Mt= merchandise imports during year t 
Xt = merchandise exports during yea:r t 
GRt-l = Actual minus desired reserves throughout previous year 
At= net aid during year t 
The t-statistics are given in parentheses under the corresponding 
coefficients. 
The fit of equation (II-1) is good; from the last column of Table II-1 
it mey- be seen that it is particularly good for post-1966 years. Taking 
that equation as embodying the average rule of thumb followed by prudent 
import control authorities, its residuals should be of interest, and not 
exempt of '1runs II reflecting persistent departures from 11prudency11 • For 
example, the 1955-56 excesses come out clearly, and are followed by the 
1958 austerity. Similarly, the swing from extreme tightness to liberalization 
during 1965-66 is also reflected in the residuals. A more insightful look 
at those subphases, however, will be obtained from quarterly data. 
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Table II-1 
Basic Data and Yearly Series Used in Im;eort Regressions 
(Million Current U.S. Dollars) 
Year Merchandise 



















1950 364.7 122.2 25.9 -4.o 395.6 100.3 
1951 419.0 111.8 25.9 5.0 463.3 94.2 
1952 415.4 140.8 1.2 46.o 473,3 85.1 
1953 546.7 183.4 31.1 22.0 596.0 90.2 
1954 671.8 223.0 39.1 21.0 657,1 99.7 
1955 669.3 157,6 45.6 20.0 579,6 112.1 
1956 657.2 126.0 -19.1 20.0 599,1 115.0 
1957 482.6 165.8 -47,5 9.0 511.1 108.0 
1958 399.9 133.4 38.4 6.0 460.7 88.5 
1959 415.6 186.2 27.8 -3.0 474.3 92.9 
1960 518.6 198.4 76.5 12.0 465,7 105,5 
1961 557.1 143.8 61.5 77.0 434.8 105.3 
1962 540.3 122.0 -3.3 80.0 463.2 104. 7 
1963 506.0 92,4 -20.6 104.o 446.1 98.1 
1964 586.3 97.6 -lU.2 85.0 545. 7 101.0 
1965 453.5 82.0 -57.2 79.0 539,l 81.7 
1966 674.3 63.8 -37,7 98.o 507.6 120.5 
1967 496.9 77.8 -114.2 93.0 509.9 99-1 
1968 643,3 115,2 -53,4 131.0 558.3 100.3 
1969 685,3 183.0 -54.6 128.0 607,5 99.7 
1970 844.0 247.0 2.1 147.0 731.6 96.0 
Sources and Method: Data on imports, exports and reserves obtained from IMF-IFS. 
"Average gross reserves during previous year" corresponding to, say, 1969, were compute4 
reported for December 1967, and Harch, June, Septemberaveraging gross reserves 
and December 1968. 111\Jet Aid;f refers to disbursements, as registered in the IMF 
Balance of Payment Yearbook, covering long term. loans received by central and local 
Table II-1 Continued 
governments, as well as those received by the private non-monetary sector from 
the IADB, the IBRD, the IFC and the U.S. government, minus amortizations of those 
loans. Data for 1950 through 1955 on these loans involved rough estimates. 
The coefficients for exports and net aid are not significantly different 
from one, while the const&~t term is insignificant, all of which corresponds 
to what one would expect a priori. The coefficient for the difference between 
actual and desired reserves has the expected sign and is significant; it 
implies that 71 percent of the excess (or short fall) in gross reserves 
during last year is spent on (or reduced) imports during this year. Experiments 
introducing further lags in the GR variable were unsuccessful. 2 
Reliable quarterly data start in 1957; Table II-2 presents series used 
in the following regression, as well as in other not shown: 
(II-2) Mt= 77.24 + 0.22 Xt + 0.15 GRt l + 1.72 At 
(4.3) (1.4) (2.2) - (5.0) 
F-test = 17.4 
DW = 1.65 
Observations= 58 
The subscript !_ now refers to a given q_uarter; GRt-l refers to actual minu.s 
desired reserves throughout the previous three quarters only. In contrast 
with regression (II-1), current Pxpn-r+.~ An nn+ rP~~h h;gh levels of signifi-
cance; indeed, dropping exports from the regression leads to only a slight 
drop in the R2 (to 0.47), but to an increase in the F-test (to 24.7), and 
in the t-ratios of the other variables, including the constant term. The 
rivalry between the constant term and exports for significance in equations 
(II-1) and (II-2) suggest that iifine-tuning 11 import licensing to (expected) 
quarterly export changes is not attempted, or if attempted is not fully 
reflected within one quarter, requiring a longer time period to work itself 
out on observed imports. 
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Table II-2 
Basic Data and Quarterly Series Used in ImEort Regressions 
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Table II-2 Continued 
Year and Merchandise Average Actual l'Jet Merchandise Actual Imports 
Imports, cif minus Desired .Aid Exports as Percentages ofQuarter 
Gross Reserves those Predicted by 
throughout Equation (II-2) 
Previous Three
Quarters 
1965-1 110.4 -51.5 19.8 119.8 84.7 
2 126.9 ~-48. 5 19.8 138.2 94.1 
3 111.0 -54.8 19.8 141.6 82.4 
4 105.2 -1+7. 5 19.8 138.2 77.9 
24. 5 123.8 99.61966-1 140.4 -40.8 
2 168.0 -59.8 21t.• 5 140.7 118.4 
3 193.4 -72.5 24.5 131.6 140.1 
4 172.4 -96.5 24.5 110.3 132.8 
114.1 1]9.21967-1 149.3 -118.5 23.3 
2 111.1 -111.8 23.3 129.0 85.7 
3 118.1 -90.8 23.3 129.9 88.9 
4 118.5 -66.o 23.3 136.8 85.9 
128.4 101.81968-1 157.4 -50.8 32.8 
2 167.0 -56.5 32.8 140.1 106.8 
3 162.7 -60.0 32. 8 144.o 103.8 
4 156.2 -56.o 32.8 145.7 99.0 
86. 31969-1 133.8 -43.3 32.0 131.5 
2 168.5 -12.3 32.0 168.2 100.4 
3 203.1 o.8 32.0 149.2 122.8 
4 180.6 2.3 32.0 156.3 108.0 
8.0 210.4 85.91970-l 161.8 36.8 
2 176.9 28.0 36.8 202.2 93.4 
3 209.7 54.8 36.8 175.1 112.0 
4 206.3 68.8 36.8 139.0 113.9 
91.8 58.3 36.8 161.6 49.71971-1 
50.0 36.8 186.0 122.92 232.2 
Sources and Method: As in Table II-1. nAverage actual minus desired gross reserves 
throughout previous three quarters
11 calculated using the relevant data for actual 
and desired reserves at the end of t-1, t-2, t-3 and t-4, where!_ refers to quarters. 
Yearly net aid figures were allocated to quarters in equal parts; data on net aid for 
1971 were set equal to those for 1970-i which are provisional. 
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As the GRt-l variables in equations (II-1) and (II-2) are very similar 
(contrast the figures corresponding to the first quarter of each yea:r in 
Table II-2 to those for the same year in Table II-•l), the coefficient 
for GRt-l in equation (II-2) should be multiplied by four, yielding 0.583, 
before comparing it to that in (II-1). The lower figure for the quarterly 
regression is partly ex:Plained by the fact that its GRt-l refers only to 
three quarters, while it covers four quarters in regression (II-1). 
The coefficient for net aid in equation (II-2) is higher than the 
expected 1.0; similar results were also obtained using gross aid. It 
should be noted that the quarterly aid figures are rough estimates; never­
theless, an aid coefficient siGnificantly higher than one may be picking 
up the effect of aid 11 leverage:: on import liberalization, an avowed policy 
goal of aid-providers during the period under study. It could also reflect 
a perverse de facto positive correlation of aid disbursements with 
11good 
times 11 ( compare the figures for 1967 with those for earlier and later years). 
Experiments introducing seasonal dUilll'ly variables, as well as actual 
minus desired reserves further lagged yielded insignificant results, but 
no systematic effort was made to calculate the best reserve lag structure. 
The last column of Table II-2 presents actual imports as percentages 
of those predicted by equation (II-··2). Quarterly import series naturally 
reflect more clearly than annual data brief unusual events, some which are 
interesting for our study, e.g. , a temporary closing of the office issuing 
import permits, as during late in 1962, but also other, less relevant events 
{harbor and shipping strikes, etc.). The swings around a prudent norm are 
also more visible in the quarterly residuals, without leading to a catastrophic 
Durbin-Watson statistic. 3 Noteworthy "runs!! in actual imports are those of 
1958-3 through 1959-1 (austerity), a,,,.d the remarkable swings from austerity 
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(1965-1 through 1965-4) to excess (1966-2 through 1967-1) and back to 
austerity (1967-2 through 1967--4). 
h 
· 
The Allocation of Observed Merchandise Imports into Different Categories 
Having derived a.~ overall import function, the next step is to analyze 
how that import capacity was distributed among commodity types. Several 
ways of classifying imports are possible. This section will use three sub­
divisions, based on annual data: consumer goods, raw materials and interme­
diate goods, and capital goods. 
The allocation of imports among those categories will, of course, be 
influenced by long and short term forces; among the former import substituting 
industrialization looms large. But from the viewpoint of this study, it 
will be of greater interest to explore hypotheses regarding whether (and how) 
import control authorities modify import structure depending on import 
capacity. 
Table II-3 presents the data to be analyzed, from two different sources. 
As the borderline between the three broad categories are not always unambiguous, 
there are differences between the two sources. It may be seen in Table II-4 
that clear significant trends appear both for BdlR and ECLA data for consumer 
good shares (downward) and capital good shares (upward); the results are, 
however, mixed for the share of raw materials and intermediate goods. 
It is part of the conventional wisdom that import control authorities 
squeeze capital goods first during difficult times, while trying to maintain 
the flow of raw materials and intermediate goods. If so, the share of capital 
goods in the import bill should be positively related with the level of 
imports, while that for raw materials and intermediate goods should show an 
inverse relationship. The latter expectation is confirmed by the results 
Table II-3 
Allocation of :i::lerchandise Imports P.m.ong Maj or Categories 
{Percentages of total imports, cif, all data expressed 
in U.S. dollars at current prices) 
Year Consumer Goods plus Ra~ Materials and Capital Goods including 
Residual Category Intermedie,te Goods Construction Materials 
ECLA 
, .. ~ ECLA BdlR ECLA BdlR 
1951 13,1 18.3 53.6 42.3 33.4 39.242,91952 11.9 18.4 50. 8 38.7 37.3 
1953 16.0 19.8 45.7 33.7 38.3 46.5 
1954 18.4 22.1 44.6 33.3 37.0 44.6 
17.8 4lf. 8 35.1 40.3 47.11955 14.9 
38. 5 4o.4 48.71956 9.6 12.9 50.0
1957 9.6 12.0 57.6 48.2 32.8 39.8
12.5 58.7 45.8 33.0 41.71958 8.3
1959 7,5 12.5 55.7 45.1 36.8 42.5 
1960 7.8 12.5 48.8 42.5 43.5 45.1 
1961 10.1 18.2 42.4 39. 5 47.4 42.4 
1962 9.5 14.8 47.8 42.6 42.7 42.6 
1963 8.3 8.5 50.5 48.9 41.2 42.6 
1964 8.9 6.2 45.9 46.4 45.2 47.4 
1965 8.3 4.o 47.4 1~3.9 44.3 52.1 
1966 8.4 6.6 56.8 52.1 34.8 41.3 
3.7 46.o 43.3 44.2 53,01967 9.9
1968 9.8 5,4 1.i6. 4 41.7 43,9 53,0 
1969 11,5 n. a. 46.o n .a. 42.5 n. a. 
Sources and Method: BdlR-XLV and XLVI IAGJD, page 167; ECLA-SB, several issues. 
Initials "n.a." mean data are not available. 
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of Table II-4, but the former does not clearly emerge as statistically 
significant, although the sign is the expected one. There is little doubt 
that the severe import restrictions of 1957-58 were particularly harsh on 
machinery and equipment imports; however, the regressions for the whole 
period warn us against generalizing from that experience, and from assuming 
that more liberal import policies will necessarily lead to a bigger share 
for capital good imports. Observe how in 1966 that share fell as imports 
rose dramatically. 
A positive link between the share of consumer goods and import levels, 
however, can be established with confidence for the whole period, at 
least for the BdlR data. 5 
In countries with weak machinery and equipment industries, one can 
expect aid flows, partly designed to promote investment, to influence the 
share of capital goods in total imports. Such influence, of course, need 
not be dollar-for-dollar; for example, food aid which supports a shift of 
agricultural workers to construction projects can contribute to capital 
formation even though it has no direct impact on the imports of capital goods. 
But typically, a significant link can be expected; this is indeed the case 
for Colombia, as shown in the last two regressions of Table II-4; very 
similar results are obtained if net, rather than gross1 aid disbursements 
are used. The following tabulation collapses the relevant data into pre-
and post-Alliance for Progress averages: 
Gross Aid as Net Aid as Share of Capital 
Percentage Percentage Goods in ImJ:?ort Bill 
of Im:eorts of Imports BdlR ECLA 
1951 through 1960 6.o 3.0 37 .3 43.8 
1961 through 1968 or 1969 22.6 17.0 42.9 46.8 
-Ba-
Table II-4 
Trends and Other Variables nExplaining" Shares in the Import Bill: 
Regression Results, with Coefficients (and t-statistics) 
Aid as a 
Import Percentage of 
Constant Trend Level All Imports 
Consumer Goods 
--BdlR 5.38 -0.38 0.017 0,59 
(2.0) (4.3) (3,3) 
--ECLA 15,74 0.012 0.79 
(4.1) (1.6) 
Raw Materials and 
Intermediate Goods 
--BdlR 62.30 -0.03 -0.023 0.23 
(10.5) (0.2) (2.1) 
--ECLA 47,91 o.63 -0.022 o.48 
(8.8) (3.4) (2.1) 
Capital Goods 
--BdlR 32,37 o.42 0.006 0.34 
(6.4) (2.5) (0,7) 
--ECLA 36.24 0.36 0.010 0.28 
(6.7) (2.0) (1.0) 
--BdlR 30.19 0.34 o.42 
(5,7) (3.4) 
--ECLA 34.52 0.014* 0.30 0.32 
(6.o) (1.3) (2.7} 
*Import level defined differently than in previous regressruons. See Below. 
Sources and Method: Basic data as in Table IT-3 and Chapter I. 1
1 Import level11 
refers to total merchandise imports, in current U.S. dollars, except in the last 
two regressions, where it is defined as all imports minus 1;aidi;. Gross aid 
disbursements were used as a measure of 11 aid". Regressions refer to 1951 through 
1968 (ECLA) or through 1969 (BdlR). Average shares for other data for the whole 
period were as follows: 
Consumer Goods 
Raw Materials and Intermediate Goods 
Capital Goods 
Gross Aid as Percentage of Imports 
Net Aid as Percentage of Imports 









It is not possible to separate statistically the effects of the 
trend and aid variables; when they are run in the same regression, both 
become insignificant. 
Unregistered Merchandise Imports 
Given the long Colombian coasts on both the Pacific and the Atlantic 
and its frontiers with Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador and Panama, which 
yield more than nine thousand kilometers of sea and land borders, coupled with 
~he rigorous import control system, it is natural to wonder whether some 
6merchandise imports escape official registration, control and taxes. 
It is obvious that some smuggling does take place. During August 1971 
smuggled foreign cigarettes were openly sold in Bogota's main avenues, and 
this author was pleasantly s'tartJ ed to find Cuban cigars available in a 
Cartagena restaurant. Businessmen often tell of sending an employee to 
Miami to bring back, well-hidden in his suit case, small but critical parts 
and pieces, which they feel would be unduly delayed or excessively taxed 
by the import control mechanism. Some cities on the Venezuelan and Ecuadorian 
borders are well-known centers of two-way unregistered trade. But the exact 
extent of such commerce is, of course, difficult to ascertain. Yet for the 
purpose of this chapter, it is necessary to try to establish at least whether 
or not unregistered imports invalidate the results obtained manipulating 
registered import data. 
A first appraoch will compare Colombian official import data with what 
trade partners clairn they have exported to Colombia. This is done, for three 
broad geographical categories, in Table II-5. As Colombia reports imports 
c.i.f., and most countries register their exports f.o.b., a gap of roughly 
ten percent is to be expected between the two sets of figures. For 1958 
through 1969 this is close to what one obtains, on average. There is, however, 
-9a-
Table II-5 
Ratio of Registered Colombian Imports (cif) to 
Exports to Colombia Registered by Other Countries, 1958-70 
World United States, European Other 
United Kingdom Common Countries 
and Canada Market 
1.24 0.631958 1.07 1.09 
1.121959 1.13 1.16 1.03 
1960 1.13 1.17 1.08 1.02 
1961 1.11 1.11 1.08 1.18 
1962 1.18 1.20 1.18 1.09
1.081963 1.03 1.00 1.06 
1.141964 1.11 1.09 1.11 
1965 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.11 
1966 1.07 1.06 1.11 1.05 
1967 1.12 1.06 1.18 1.23 
1.01 1.001968 1.02 1.06 
1.041969 1.03 1.02 1.04 
Averages 1.09 1.10 1.09 1.06 
Sources and Method: Basic data obtained from n~F-DOT, several issues. The 
corresponding ratios for the group formed by the U.S., U.K. and Canada during 
1948-58 were as follows: 
1948 = 1.17 
~ n),n , no
.J..;7'"t;7 = J..•V/ 
1950 = 1.09 
1951 = 1.17 
1952 = 1.16 
1953 = 1.13 
1954 = 1.16 
1955 = 1.23 
1956 = 1.25 
1957 = 1.16 
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considerable year-to-year fluctuations, and a downward trend, if U.S., 
U.K., and Canadian figures for 1948-58 are compared to those for 1958-70. 
A good deal of the year-to--year varietion appears to simply reflect statistical. 
difficulties, but some of it can be linked to events in the Colombian pay­
ments system. For example, the unusual gaps between Colombian and foreign 
data in 1955-56 (for the U.S., U.K. and Canada) and in 1962 suggest that 
7
overinvoicing was used as a means to speculate against an overvalued peso. 
Most smuggled merchandise will appear neither in the official trade 
figures of the importing nor the exporting country, or if they appear in the 
latter they will not be allocated correctly among importing countries (i.e., 
much merchandise apparently sent to Panama and Venezuela may end up in 
Colombia; note that apparent per capita Panamerican and Venezuelan imports 
in 1970 were $245 and $158, respectively, to Colombia's $40). It is, of 
course, difficult to measure accurately such trade, but its importance has 
prompted 11guesstimatesn of its value, one of which is presented in Table II-6. 
Columns two and three reflect minor statistical adjustments to import data 
as reported to the TI1F by Colombia; the first column represents an attempt 
to estimate import smuge;ling. The i!border trade" has fluctuated between 
4 and 10 percent of registered imports. :Not surprisingly the high point 
was reached during troubled 1962, while the estimates for liberal 1966 
are much lower. One ma;y speculate that most (but not all) border trade 
imports involve consumer goods (liquor, cigarettes, radios, watches, 
and even pornographic materials). But given the orders of magnitude involved 
it appears that neither the results of Table II-4 nor of earlier regressions 
would be much changed by their neglect of border trade. 
-lOa-
Table II-6 
Unregistered Merchandise Imports, c.i.f. 
(Million U.s. dollars) 
Border Trade Ships Purchased Other Border Trade 
(Imports) by the Great- (Including 




1957 20 5 0 4 
1958 20 6 0 5 
1959 20 2 0 5 
1960 20 3 0 4 
1961 20 3 0 4 
1962 51 0 0 10 
1963 40 0 0 8 
1964 50 7 0 9 
1965 30 7 -11-i:- 7 
1966 25 19 0 4 
1967 28 4 1 6 
1968 33 0 10 5 
1969 37 0 10 5 
1970 43 0 12 5 
Sources and Method: IMF-BOPY, several issues. 
* Refers to military grants, which by international convention are omitted from 
the Balance of Payments. 
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Imports and Capital Formation 
Chapter I noted the important link which exists in Colombia between 
foreign trade and capital formation{and not between current GDP or manufacturing 
output and trade.) 8 Such?link does not involve subtle and mysterious relation­
ships between exports (or terms of trade) and propensities to save. The 
matter is much simpler. In 1950 imported commodities accounted for 96 percent 
of Colombian gross investment in machinery and equipment; by 1969 that share 
was still a remarkable 75 percent in spite of an average annual growth of 
14 percent in the local output of machinery and equipment. Even granting 
a likely underestimation of local production of (small) machinery and 
equipment, the brute fact remains that during the period under study physical 
non-construction Colombian investment could hardly be realized, at least 
during a longish medium-term, without a matching capacity to import. Coffee, 
and later aid and minor exports, were the basis of non-construction capital 
formation. lifote that nothing in the argument assures us that the flow of 
imported capital goods will be assigned wisely, so that even in the long 
run no · · · ween growth and t he t o 1.mport Indeed,r1.g1.d/need exist be ·tl:i,nk t capac1. y . • 
it ca.~ be argued that periods of import bonanza can lead to a careless allcca-
tion of investment, while austerity strengthens the hand of benefit-cost 
analysts, leading to fluctuations in the marginal capital-output ratio which 
offset (partly or totally) variations in the import capacity. But without 
that import capacity, even heroic ex-ante savings decisions are likely to 
be frustrated before becoming tangible ex-post non-construction investments. 
Table II-7 documents the capital formation-import link, where imports 
and trend, the latter reflecting the expansion of local capital goods production, 
appear as the independent variables. Total merchandise imports, both in 
Table II-7 
Links between Capital Formation and Imports: Regression Results 
(All variables~ except trend, transformed into logarithms) 
All
Imports, Import 
F-test DWConstant Current Quantum Trend 
U.S. $ 
Building and 5.16 0.32 0.041 0.91 88.6 l.23 
(7.4} (2.8) (10.6}
Construction 
5.67 0.31 0,047 0.91 86.o l.20 
(10.4) (2.6) (13.0) 
Transport Equip­ o.68 1.11 -0.002 0.81 35.8 1.99 
(0.8) (7.8) (0.4)
ment and 
Machinery 2.17 1.12 0.016 o.84 44.3 1.83 
(3.6) (8.7) (4.1) 
0.72 0.020 0.93 109.2 2.59All Gross 3.60 
Real Fixed ( 7. 2) (8.7) (7.1) 
Domestic 
4.61 0.72 0.031 0.93 119.1 2.41Capital 
(9.2) (13.0)Formation (12.5) 
0.80 34.1 2.15Imports of -0.20 1.26 
I <' .-. \
Capital ( 0 .2) ~ 0. j' 
Goods~ 
0.001 o.84 43.8 2.00BdlR 1.49 1.27
(2.3) (9.4) (0.3) 
Sources and Method: Time series ( at constant 1958 Colombian prices) on gro
ss investment 
and imports of capital goods obtained from BdlR-CN, including unpublished e
stimates. 
All regressions cover the period 1950 through 1969. Merchandise imports, b
oth dollar 
values and quantum indices, were obtained from IMF-IFS. Building and Cons
truction 




current dollars and as quantum indices, are used. The link emerges quite 
clearly from these regressions; one can discount part of the excellence 
of the fit (on grounds of national accounting methodology) without losing 
the main conclusion. 
The elasticity of real gross investment in machinery and equipment 
with respect to merchandise imports is not significantly different from 
one; that for all investment emerges as slightly below one. Even investment 
in construction shows some significant elasticity with respect to imports, 
although its trend variables, as expected, show heftier t-~statistics than 
those for machinery and eq_uipment. The Durbin-..watson statistics for the 
construction regressions also hint that we are leavine; out important 
independent variables in the explanation of that type of investment, a 
fact we know from Chapter I. 
Differences between trend coefficients in regressions using quantum 
versus current dollar values for imports reflect the upward creep in dollar 
prices paid by Colombia~ which ma..v be estimated at between one and two 
percent per year. The trend coefficient for machinery and equipment implies 
that, with a stagnant import quantum, that kind of investment could rise at 
only 1.6 percent per annum. 
The last pair of regressions presented in Table II-7 compare the time 
series for imports of capital goods used in the BdlR national accounts 9 with 
total imports. In apparent contrast to the results presented earlier in 
this chapter (Table II-4), the elasticity of capital goods imports with 
respect to import levels seems greater than one. But such result is not 
quite significant) leaving our earlier conclusion of proportionality (excluding 
trend and/or aid) 1.U:chan8ed. 
The fits obtained in Table II-7 could be further improved by making 
investment depend not on total imports, but on just imports of capital 
goods. Such refinement, however, seems unnecessary, and even inelegant, 
given the proportionality conclusion, as well as national accounts methodology. 
Furthermore, there are at least three time series on imports of capital 
goods; two from BdlR sources, one in constant Pesos and one in current dollars, 
and one from UNECLA, in current dollars. The three series, however, tell 
10essentially the same story. 
The rapid growth observed, for the whole :!)eriod, in the domestic production 
of machinery and eq_-:J.ipment suggests that in the future the link between imports 
and capital formation will be less tight than in the past. However, national 
accounts data show a sharp decline in the ex:pansion of locally produced 
industrial capital goods, from an ennual rate of 20. 7 percent registered 
between 1952 and 1962, to a modest 6.6 percent observed during 1962 through 
1969. Such a decline may partly reflect a failure of ste.tistical coverage, 
although it could also indicate a lessening of policy emphasis on import 
substitution for machinery and equipment. 
Footnotc:s to Chapter II 
* Besides those thanked :;.n Cllc.pte1- I, this charter owes much to Albert 
Fishlow's criticism of an ;.,:arEer draft, cmd. to Miguel Urrutia's kind help. 
1. Note that the definition of desir-ed r::::se:nres makes one independent 
variable ( actual minus desired reserves) partly a function of the lagged 
dependent variable. 
2. The (economic) -2xpectation was that proper specification of the lags 
would yield coefficients for the GR variables ~dd.ine up to one. But 
that expectation cannot be realized. econometrically. 
3. Although gj_ven thE; defl.nition of the GR v.;;;.I'ia~J~.e, the legitimacy of 
using the Durb.:~1-Watson statistic is in do"J.bt. 
114. Given ~io1:L lmowleC.:g-2 regarding import .licensing during these11 runs , 
a case could be mad,-= for int:roducing different ctummy varie,bles for those 
periods, improving the :regression :results. Bu:~ little of substance would 
5. Note that 11 im:9ort levels,; 1·ef"'r to impo::-c vc:cJ.ues at current dollar prices. 
6. The ColombiGn is:umds ol' S&n. A,1c.re's, off the coast of Nicaragua in 
the Caribbean, h2.VE.; free--po:rt p1·~vileg,2s. Heavy 7,ouri:1t traffic between 
those islands and th,:: Colc.·r.1b::..cn rnai:1le11<'i ac1d to +,he smuggling possibilities. 
7. Thus, some 0 ~, che de:pa.:r'tureLl f::om pruC:.en,:y 6.et0cted in tLe first part 
of this chri.pter sho·L11,1. be inte::prc:t:-:d. broadJ.y. to i:o ::lude excesses in the 
licensing of im;o:rt :- _a:nd/g_::-__ cn_1i tal ex11orts. 
A 
8. Corr2l;:,,ting yec·.,:·•-·co-yr:m.· :pt.:r-cc;:-.tage che1.:.e:es in real GDP (GDP) and 
~. 
manufacturine; ,,•;-cput (M\) with tho;:;e for the uolL1.r vD.lue of merchandise 
" imports (M) , dn.~·:i ng the ::;ems y,:car (t) ,.. and the yeo.r before (t-1), the 
following resuHs a:.·E. cic,ta:;_,·_erl, fer ~.he period 1951 thr,,ugh 1969: 
-II-3-
(1) (2) 






Trend 0.015 0.014 
(7.7) (5.4) 
R2 0.97 0.95 
-II-2-
AA A 
(GDP\ = 4.60 + 0.05 (M)t + 0.02 (M) 
(15.4) (3.6) (1.5) t-l 
A A 
= 6.06 + 0.05 (M)t + 0.02 (M)t l 
(18.6) (3.4) (1.0) -
' 2 
R = 0. 43 
The mean values were as follows: 
A 
(GDP\ = 4.96 
A 
(JYJ.A) t = 6.40 
A 
(M)t = 4.78 
A 
(M) = 5.25t-1 
Thus, while there is a significant link between import and output growth, 
the constant terms acconnt for 93 and 95 percent, respectively, of GDP and 
manufacturing average year-to--year growth. See also the interesting article 
by Alberto Corchuelo R. and Luis 3ernardo Florez E. , ;;El Sector Externo 
/ ~ 
y las Fluctuaciones de Corto Plaza de 18, Economia", in DANE, Boletin Mensual 
de Estadistica, No. 244, lfoviembre 1971, pp. 9-21. 
9. Alas, these constant-peso series are not identical to those (constant­
dollar) series shown in Table II-3, above, also labelled 
11 BdlR"1 • Let us 
refer to them as BdlR(Peso) and BdlR(Dollar) series, respectively. 
2
10. The R between the lliiECLA series, and that of the BdlR(Dollar) for 
1950 through 1969 is O. 87. With the logarithm of real gross domestic capital 
formation as the dependent variable, and wit:1 those two series (the logs of)on 
capital goods imports ( CGJ\1), as well as trend, as independent variables, 
the following results are obtained: 
